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Abstract  
Previous research suggests that gays and lesbians not only 
look to the law as an important site of social recognition but 
also pursue strategies to legitimate their relationships out-
side of the law, such as having commitment ceremonies in re-
ligious institutions. While previous research suggests that ho-
mosexuality is a divisive issue within religious communities, 
we know little about how heterosexual religious people un-
derstand same-sex marriage. I aim to fill this gap and analyze 
the rights consciousness of heterosexual members in liberal re-
ligious denominations. Drawing on in-depth interviews, I ex-
amine how people make sense of the relationship between law 
and social change. While all interviewees support same-sex 
marriage, they express a contradictory understanding of how 
it should become legal in the USA. I analyze how they rec-
oncile this contradiction within the context of their religious 
institutions. 
Keywords:  same-sex marriage, religion, legal consciousness, 
rights, Unitarian Universalism, United Church of Christ 
The issue of same-sex marriage has garnered national 
attention in the USA within the last two decades. Al-
though gay and lesbian couples took part in ceremonies 
to mark their commitment long before this attention 
(Chauncey, 1994; Lewin, 1998) and same-sex couples 
first applied for marriage licenses in 1970 (Chauncey, 
2004; Cott, 2000; Graf, 1999), events over the past 
20 years catapulted the issue of same-sex marriage onto 
the national cultural and political landscape. While the 
Defense of Marriage Act in 1996 federally defines mar-
riage as between one man and one woman, at the state 
level, laws vary tremendously. Some states issue mar-
riage licenses to same-sex couples, an outcome that has 
been reached through state legislatures votes (Vermont 
and New Hampshire) as well as through state Supreme 
Court decisions (Iowa, Massachusetts, and Connecti-
cut). Other states offer alternative forms of legal recog-
nition for same-sex couples, such as civil unions (New 
Jersey) or domestic partnerships (Wisconsin). Still other 
states have amended their state constitutions to ban 
same-sex marriage through voter-approved ballot initia-
tives, including the ballot initiatives in 11 states during 
the 2004 presidential election and the 2008 Proposition 8 
initiative in California. 
As these varied legal changes with regard to gay 
marriage illustrate, decisions about gay marriage have 
been reached at the federal and state levels and in leg-
islative, judicial, and executive realms. Indeed, the 
question of how legalization of gay marriage should 
occur has been a focus in public discourse. Take, for 
instance, the recent voter decision in Iowa to remove 
three Supreme Court justices who were part of the de-
cision to legalize gay marriage. The Iowa vote has been 
applauded by anti-gay marriage organizations like 
the National Organization for Marriage, whose presi-
dent posits that judges wrongly “usurped the will of 
the people and imposed gay marriage” (National Or-
ganization for Marriage, 2010). The executive direc-
tor of a pro-gay marriage organization, One Iowa, as-
serts that the courts are “there to protect the minority 
against the tyranny of the majority” (Sulzberger 2010). 
What about people outside social movement organiza-
tions or courtrooms? How do they make sense of gay 
marriage and the relationship between legal and social 
change? 
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Employing a legal consciousness framework that fo-
cuses on how the law is understood by ordinary people 
in everyday life (Ewick and Silbey, 1998), I analyze in this 
article how heterosexuals make sense of gay marriage. 
Since religion and morality have been a focus in discus-
sions about same-sex marriages and much attention has 
been given to conservative and evangelical Christian per-
spectives on same-sex marriage, the data presented here 
come from in-depth interviews with members of two lib-
eral religious denominations. Given that all of the inter-
viewees support marriage rights for same-sex couples, 
I do not focus on whether or not they support same-sex 
marriage. Rather, I ask: What are the narratives they use 
to describe what same-sex marriage means and how it 
should become legal? I demonstrate how a contradiction 
exists in their narratives about how same-sex marriage 
should become legal. Religious progressives express an 
understanding that legal change should and often does 
happen prior to social change, and therefore, same-sex 
marriage should be legal regardless of societal attitudes. 
However, they also express an understanding that social 
change should occur prior to legal change, and therefore, 
same-sex marriage should and will become legal only af-
ter the majority of people support it. I also ask: How do 
they reconcile this contradiction within their religious 
context? As religious progressives, they value the abil-
ity for an individual to decide his or her own morals and 
stress the importance of the democratic process. Further-
more, their experiences in congregations with welcoming 
policies toward gays and lesbians inform their optimism 
that the majority of people will support same-sex mar-
riage in the future. Thus, while they support same-sex 
marriage, they believe that it is appropriate for decisions 
about it to be reached democratically and accept differing 
opinions about it. As they are unsatisfied with the current 
majority opinion with regard to same-sex marriage, yet 
also are not interested in imposing their opinion on oth-
ers, religious progressives believe that the majority opin-
ion will eventually change. Before turning to these find-
ings and discussion, I outline the theoretical frameworks 
and the existing literature that ground this research and 
detail the research methods and data on which this pa-
per is based. 
Literature Review
Legal Consciousness
Sociolegal studies articulate the need to analyze the 
relationship between law, rights, and social context 
(Galanter, 2006; Garth and Sterling, 1998). While debate 
exists about the nature of that relationship and the ex-
tent to which rights matter (e.g., McCann, 1996; Rosen-
berg, 1996), many argue that rights, social context, and 
consciousness are mutually constitutive (e.g., Ewick and 
Silbey, 1998; Harrington and Yngvesson, 1990; McCann, 
1994; Ygnvesson, 1993). In this way, rights are emblem-
atic of communication, meaning-making, and social in-
clusion. Rights are a communal discourse that individ-
uals draw on to make sense of who they are and what 
they deserve and to convince others about how they 
should be treated (Minow, 1987; Williams, 1987). Thus, 
the contestation of the meaning of rights take place not 
only in courtrooms or among those directly pursuing 
social change, but also in everyday life (Ewick and Sil-
bey, 1998; Merry, 1990; Sarat and Kearns, 1993). As re-
search addresses the meanings of rights in everyday life, 
the goal should not be only to outline people’s every-
day understanding of the law, but also to analyze what 
made those perceptions possible and the effects of such 
perceptions (Silbey 2005). Scholars have pursued this 
line of inquiry to analyze rights consciousness across a 
range of topics, including disability (Engel and Munger, 
2003), fatness (Kirkland, 2008), work (McCann, 1994), 
and same-sex marriage (Harding, 2006, 2008; Hull, 2006). 
Hull (2006) finds that the law is an important site for 
many gays and lesbians and that the legal recognition 
of marriage is desired not only for its practical benefits 
but also for the perceived social and cultural legitimacy 
of the law. She also argues that gay and lesbian couples 
enact alternative forms of legality outside of official law 
through acts such as having public rituals or ceremo-
nies and using terms like “spouse” or “wife” to describe 
their same-sex partners. She explains that couples often 
turn to religious institutions when having a public rit-
ual, and thus, “religion often functions as an alternative 
to the state as a source of legality” (Hull, 2006, p. 652). 
Given that many gays and lesbians look to religious in-
stitutions as site to enact legality, it is important to un-
derstand how heterosexual members in such religious 
institutions understand this move and how they inter-
pret same-sex marriage more broadly. Moreover, much 
of legal consciousness scholarship often looks at how 
people make sense of law as they think about pursing or 
actively pursue their own rights claims. The study shifts 
attention away from how individuals think about their 
own rights to a focus on how people make sense of oth-
ers’ rights claims, which is particularly important given 
an understanding of rights as a communal discourse. 
Religion, Politics, and Sexuality
A number of scholars have analyzed the intersec-
tion of religion, politics, and sexuality in American 
society (e.g., Davis and Robinson, 1996; Hunter, 1991; 
Olson and Carroll, 1992; Wuthnow, 1988). Some ar-
gue that “the culture wars,” a “war” characterized 
by divisions over religion and morality that translate 
into the political sphere, is exaggerated and that the 
liberal—conservative religious split does not trans-
late neatly into a liberal–conservative political divide 
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(Davis and Robinson, 1996; Olson and Carroll, 1992). 
However, nearly all scholars point to sexuality, spe-
cifically homosexuality, as a divisive issue within re-
ligious communities and as an issue around which 
leaders and members mobilize within congregations 
and in the political sphere (Cadge et al., 2007, 2008; 
Cadge and Wildeman, 2008; Ellingon et al., 2001; 
Moon, 2004; Stein, 2001). 
In fact, religion often occupies a central focus in ex-
plaining opposition to same-sex marriage. Consider, 
for instance, the discussions following the 2004 pres-
idential election that linked the passage of constitu-
tional amendments that ban same-sex marriage in 
eleven states with voters’ “moral values.” Analyses 
indicate that, in fact, those who indicated that moral 
values are an important priority are more likely to be 
opposed to same-sex marriage (Olson et al. 2006). Re-
search has focused on why and how conservative and 
evangelical Christians mobilize around anti-gay poli-
tics (Irvine, 2005; Linneman, 2004). Among the rheto-
ric that anti-gay organizations use in their activism in-
clude language such as “homosexual activists” and 
“liberal courts” (Irvine, 2005, p. 10). Linneman (2004) 
illustrates how the rise in anti-gay sentiment among 
conservative Christians stems from the fact that this 
population sees themselves as facing an environment 
that is increasing hostile. Specifically, they understand 
progress for gays and lesbians to be linked to their own 
marginalization. 
The bulk of this literature analyzes Evangelical or 
Mainline Protestant denominations and focuses on the 
current struggles congregations face when dealing with 
homosexuality. This focus reflects a limitation, particu-
larly given that there is variation within religious tradi-
tions with respect to views on same-sex sexuality and 
not all religious traditions oppose same-sex marriage or 
mobilize around anti-gay activism. Churches that em-
phasize social justice can often provide a context to ad-
vocate for social change and rights for sexual minor-
ities due to their unique position outside of legal and 
state realms (Howe, 2007). Furthermore, many denom-
inations have adopted official policies welcoming gays 
and lesbians for decades and have supported same-sex 
marriage, including the United Church of Christ and the 
Unitarian Universalist Association,1 but there has been 
little scholarly attention paid to such denominations. 
Moreover, we know relatively little about how religious 
people make sense of same-sex marriage. By analyzing 
the rights consciousness of heterosexual members of lib-
eral religious congregations, this article attempts to fill 
these gaps. 
Gay and Lesbian Sexuality in a Post-Closet World
That debates about same-sex marriage are occurring 
in American politics reflects an increasing consciousness 
in the public imagination about gays and lesbians (Gam-
son, 1998; Walters, 2001). Seidman (2002) terms this mo-
ment a “post-closet” one insofar as gays and lesbians are 
no longer living double lives or denying their sexuality. 
Rather, gay and lesbians are accepting their sexual iden-
tity and integrating it into the rest of their social lives. Se-
idman also draw attention to the fact that the normal-
ization process around gay and lesbian identity is true 
only for some gays and lesbians—namely, those who are 
“gender conventional, well adjusted, and integrated into 
mainstream society; she is committed to home, family, ca-
reer and nation” (p. 14). Furthermore, Seidman notes that 
the transformation of gay and lesbian life is incomplete—
in interpersonal, cultural, and institutional realms—and 
highlights contradictions in the “post-closet” life. De-
spite being able to live beyond the closet, gays and lesbi-
ans also live in a world of “heterosexual domination”—in 
where “heterosexuals enjoy a privileged, superior social 
status that is secured by the state, social institutions, and 
popular culture” (Seidman, 2002, p. 6). 
One of the ways that heterosexuality is privileged at 
the state level is reflected in the fact that the model cit-
izen is implicitly defined as heterosexual (Richardson, 
1998). There is considerable debate about the desirability 
and the consequences of efforts to contest this definition 
of citizenship by advocating for same-sex marriage (e.g. 
Ettelbrick, 1997; Eskridge, 1996; Stoddard, 1997; Warner, 
1999). Access to equal citizenship is predicated on asser-
tions that gays and lesbians are good, normal, and re-
spectable and have relationships that mirror heterosexual 
ones (Richardson, 2004). Similarly, access to equal citizen-
ship maintains the public/private binary insofar as the 
respectable gay and lesbian in the public sphere is desex-
ualized (Richardson, 2004; Warner, 1999). In effect, the 
notion of the public citizen as an “abstract, disembodied” 
individual (Lister 1997, p. 70) is not challenged in efforts 
to legally recognize same-sex marriage. 
That the Unitarian Universalist (UU) and United 
Church of Christ (UCC) congregations studied in this 
research, which have policies that welcome gays and 
lesbians, and the fact that same-sex couples do not have 
the right to marry highlight the contradictory moment 
of beyond the closet life. How then do heterosexuals 
who support same-sex marriage, but are living in a con-
text where that right is not conferred to gays and lesbi-
ans make sense of the meaning of rights and the rela-
tionship between social and legal change? 
1. The UU and the UCC denominations adopted the “welcoming” and “open and affirming” policies toward gays, lesbians, and bisexuals at the 
national level in 1989 and 1985, respectively. These denominations have also passed resolutions in support of the right for same-sex couples to 
marry (Unitarian Universalist Association, 1996; United Church of Christ, 2005a). 
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Method
The data analyzed in this article come from 19 in-
depth interviews that I conducted with heterosex-
ual members of a UU and a UCC congregation located 
in two mid-size cities in the Midwest between May 
and August of 2005. The UCC congregation adopted 
the “open and affirming” policy in 1989 and was one 
of the first churches in the state to have such a policy. 
The UU congregation adopted the “welcoming” policy 
in 1992. Ministers of both congregations perform com-
mitment ceremonies and religious marriage ceremonies 
for same-sex couples. In addition to similar stances on 
gay and lesbian issues, both the UU and the UCC de-
scribe themselves as liberal or progressive denomina-
tions (Unitarian Universalist Association, 2005a; United 
Church of Christ, 2005b). Unitarian Universalism as is a 
non-creedal religion; rather than a creed, there are seven 
principles the denomination promotes, including (1) 
the inherent worth and dignity of every person, (2) jus-
tice, equity, and compassion in human relation, (3) ac-
ceptance of one another and encouragement to spiritual 
growth in our congregation, (4) a free and responsible 
search for truth and meaning, (5) the right of conscience 
and the use of the democratic process within our con-
gregations and in society at large, (6) the goal of world 
community with peace, liberty, and justice for all, and 
(7) respect for the interdependent web of all existence 
of which we are a part (Unitarian Universalist Associ-
ation 2005b). UCC is a Christian denomination, though 
from its start “affirmed the ideal that Christians did not 
always have to agree to live together in communion” 
(United Church of Christ, 2005b). This openness across 
congregations could be what the minister at the congre-
gation where I interviewed was referring to when stat-
ing that UCCs are understood by some as “Unitarian 
Universalists Considering Christ.” Of course, this stance 
need not be a reflection of the UCC denomination as a 
whole, nor all UCC congregations,2 but is important for 
the project at hand insofar as I analyze UCC alongside 
UU members. 
To recruit participants, I announced my project dur-
ing a service (at the United Church of Christ congrega-
tion) and placed an announcement in newsletters and 
service programs (at the Unitarian Universalist con-
gregation). The announcements requested individuals 
who were members of the congregation and were will-
ing to talk about their congregation’s open and affirm-
ing or welcoming policy and their thoughts about polit-
ical and social activism and change with regard to gays 
and lesbians. In this article, I focus on the 19 interviews 
I conducted with heterosexual-identified members of 
the congregations. The majority of these participants 
(13) were recruited from the UU congregation, and six 
were recruited from the UCC congregation. The sam-
ple includes 12 women and seven men who range in age 
from 40 to 87, with the average age being 58. The racial 
makeup of the sample is overwhelmingly white, with 
only one participant who described herself as Mestizo. 
The interviews were semi-structured and followed an 
interview schedule that included questions about expe-
riences in the congregation, the welcoming or open and 
affirming policy, and social and political action, includ-
ing the anti-same-sex marriage ballot initiative. The in-
terviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. I be-
gan the analysis by reading through each transcript and 
taking notes on the themes that were most interesting. 
Some of the topics that emerged in this process, which 
Emerson et al. (1995) refer to as “open coding,” include 
that participants repeatedly characterized sexuality as a 
private, irrelevant attribute and that they placed impor-
tance on people’s ability to determine their own truth 
and values. I then further coded within the topics iden-
tified in open coding, doing “focused coding” (Emer-
son et al., 1995). For instance, one theme that emerged 
from the focused coding within the topic of “importance 
of determining own truth” is that interviewees made 
clear distinctions between their denominations and the 
religious right. After coding the interview data, I wrote 
analytic memos that linked themes, which were then 
developed into the results below. This process that en-
tailed reading each transcript, categorizing line-by-line 
once initial codes were generated, and returning to the 
coded data while writing, allowed for a close examina-
tion of the data. It allowed me to generate themes based 
on “member’s meanings” and capture the understand-
ings about same-sex marriage put forth by interviewees. 
At the same time, the codes produced and the themes 
delineated here reflect my research interests and are but 
some of the many that could have been generated (Em-
erson et al., 1995, p. 151). The quotes used are edited for 
the sake of clarity, and pseudonyms are used for each 
participant. 
Findings
Understanding of Rights
According to members of liberal religious commu-
nities, there are two competing notions of what rights 
are: Rights are understood both as a reflection of ma-
jority opinion and as counter-majoritarian. The narra-
tives that the interviewees used when talking about the 
2. Indeed, the official denominations stance is not one of “considering” Christ but of belief: “We believe in the triune God: Creator, resurrected 
Christ, the sole Head of the church, and the Holy Spirit, who guides and brings about the creative and redemptive work of God in the world” 
(United Church of Christ, 2005c). 
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right of marriage for same-sex couples reveal a tension 
about what that right would signify. In one understand-
ing, legal recognition of same-sex marriage would be a 
reflection of societal acceptance; in another, it would be 
a reflection of a transcendence of contemporary anti-gay 
societal norms. In other words, while all interviewees 
were in support of same-sex marriage, their narratives 
revealed contradictory understandings about the rela-
tionship between social and legal change. Which change 
should come first? Does (and should) social change 
happen prior to legal change? Or does (and should) le-
gal change spur changes in the social realm? Consistent 
with other legal consciousness scholarship (Ewick and 
Silbey, 1998), interviewees did not express only one un-
derstanding about law and social change. 
Majority Opinion Versus Counter-Majoritarian
When discussing same-sex marriage, all of the inter-
viewees talked about the public’s opinions and values. 
When asked about what they thought would happen in 
the USA with regards to same-sex marriage, only two 
people mentioned the Supreme Court, while the others 
all discussed the majority and its role in democratically 
deciding the future of the issue.3 Thus, according to 
one understanding, rights are a reflection of the majori-
ty’s morals and opinions, as expressed through a demo-
cratic vote. Brad clearly articulates a belief that the right 
of marriage for same-sex couples should be decided in 
such a fashion. Speaking of same-sex marriage, he said 
that he is “willing to let that be decided by the process 
that we have in place…I’d go with what the voters say 
on that.” While he “would vote to have gay marriage,” 
he also supports democratically deciding whether same-
sex couples should have the right to marry. Likewise, 
Melissa described that “[the status of gay marriage in 
the United States] unfortunately is not going to change 
because there are too many people whose very sin-
cere beliefs are quite different from mine…in a democ-
racy, that makes a big difference [because] the major-
ity does rule.” Bob also stressed the importance of the 
democratic process and stated that the country “needs 
to move” in a direction of valuing that process more: 
This country was founded on the democratic 
process that grows out of an ideology that says 
people have a right to their point of view and 
that point of view needs to be widely shared 
and widely discussed. In the democratic pro-
cess, we eventually take a position. I do not al-
ways get what I want, but it is the process that 
is more important. It is more important that 
we follow that democratic process, even if that 
may mean that some people may not get what 
they want. 
These quotes underscore the understanding that the 
public does and should have a role in deciding which 
groups are deserving of rights and which groups are 
not. While these three interviewees, like all the partici-
pants, think that same-sex couples should be able to le-
gally marry, they also express an understanding that it 
is important to uphold the opinions of the majority. 
In talking about those against same-sex marriage, the 
majority of people blamed evangelical religious beliefs, 
ignorance, and lack of experience with gay people. Im-
portantly, however, some pointed to changes in the le-
gal landscape. For instance, Megan made sense of the 
passage of state amendments in 2004 that defined mar-
riage as between one man and one woman as being a 
reaction to marriages performed in San Francisco. She 
says: “I think what made that happen was the…kinda 
in your face [of the San Francisco events]…I think 
that’s how people took it…I think there was a back-
lash.” Christine also commented that the issue of mar-
riage for same-sex couples was pushed “too fast.” In her 
view, gays and lesbians “should have stuck with [civil 
unions]…so that at least you had all the rights of a mar-
ried couple…before you got into this next thing of mar-
riage, which carries with it so much…baggage.” These 
narratives reveal how people grapple with the question 
of legal and social change. They illustrate a concern with 
same-sex couples having the right to marry “too fast,” 
or before there is societal change and a majority that 
supports same-sex marriage. 
However, interviewees also articulated the under-
standing that rights are counter-majoritarian. Rather 
than being reflective of the majority’s opinion, rights 
are understood to transcend contemporary attitudes. 
This transcendence was articulated in both legalistic and 
moral terms. Two people explicitly referenced the Su-
preme Court and the US Constitution when asked about 
what they thought would happen in the country in re-
gards to same-sex marriage. Jeff for instance said: 
I think hopefully the right Supreme Court jus-
tices will get a hold of this and see that there 
really isn’t a place for the state in regulating 
these relationships. I think judges will have to 
make the right decision. 
Jeff explained that if same-sex marriage is “up to 
the populace, I don’t think we’re gonna go very far.” 
3. I did not ask specifically about the role of the Supreme Court. However, following Engel and Munger (2003), my interest is in the narratives peo-
ple draw on to make sense of the law. Therefore, the fact that the Supreme Court was not part of most people’s narratives about gay marriage is 
telling, even though the Supreme Court might have been more salient in their narratives had I asked specifically about its role. In this way, the 
narratives presented in this section reflect people’s understandings both of what would and should happen with regard to gay marriage. 
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Heather similarly evoked a legalistic counter-majoritar-
ian view of rights when she said “our Constitution be-
lieves we have rights.” 
The view that rights exist to counter “the populace” 
was also expressed in moralistic terms. Participants 
understood rights to be a reflection of moral truth that 
transcends contemporary attitudes. This conceptual-
ization of rights was most salient when interviewees 
made “like race” arguments (Halley, 2000). The peo-
ple I interviewed drew parallels between the experi-
ences of gays and lesbians and African Americans as 
well as between same-sex marriage and interracial 
marriage. When explaining why she is “completely in 
favor of gay marriage,” Melissa said “it means dignity 
and not being separated and treated differently. Same 
with racism; why treat someone differently because of 
their race? I see it as parallel.” Shirley also analogized 
to race when talking about same-sex marriage. She re-
counted a personal exchange where someone she was 
talking with made a comment that gay groups were 
pushing the issue too fast. She explained: “I said [to 
the person making the comment], you sound like peo-
ple talking about Blacks when they were going to civil 
rights [who said] ‘just stay there under the bamboo 
tree and eat your watermelon, it’s not time.’ Come on. 
When is the time?” Shirley’s story suggests an under-
standing that same-sex marriage should exist regard-
less of how the populace thinks. Christine compared 
her current support for same-sex marriage to when 
“people took a stand in support of marriage between 
black and white 40 years ago.” Deborah echoed this 
understanding when she says “if people want to get 
married, let them get married…It shouldn’t make any 
difference whether they’re gay or lesbians or men or 
women or black or white.” In these narratives, the right 
for same-sex couples to marry comes from a sense of 
equality and morality. Thus, although drawing on dif-
ferent sources, either legalistic or moralistic, interview-
ees articulated the understanding that rights are coun-
ter-majoritarian. In these narratives, legal change with 
regard to granting rights to a minority should happen 
regardless of majority opinion. 
Material and Social Benefits
Interviewees articulated an understanding that the 
right of marriage for same-sex couples would carry 
both material benefits and social benefits. For some, 
the material benefits afforded to spouses, such as ac-
cess to healthcare or pensions, were significant aspects 
of marriage. Megan expressed: “I don’t think marriage 
is sacred. I think marriage is a civil agreement between 
two people.” Jeff likewise articulated the importance 
for same-sex couples to be able to enter into marriage 
because “when you get into property and economic 
means, there needs to be some clarity of the agreement.” 
He explained that being married means that the state 
recognizes that relationship and can protect the par-
ties involved in the event of divorce, through things 
like spousal and child support. For this reason, Jeff 
thinks that same-sex marriage should be legal. In addi-
tion, Brad said: “I’m a little cynical about issues of prin-
ciple…and I think what marriage of same-sex people is 
all about really has to do with the economic attributes 
of a marriage.” While not agreeing that material or eco-
nomic benefits were the only important aspect of mar-
riage, others did mention things like spouses having ac-
cess to healthcare as an important reason why same-sex 
marriage should be legally recognized. 
Additionally, people discussed social benefits that ac-
companied marriage. While Megan viewed marriage as 
a civil agreement that affords certain economic benefits, 
she also addressed the following reason when explain-
ing her support of same-sex marriage: “it makes per-
fect sense if people love each other and are in a relation-
ship, marriage is what is accepted in our community as 
the way you show that.” Given the fact that marriage af-
fords couples recognition from society, Megan thinks 
gay and lesbian couples should be able to marry. Like-
wise, Charles commented: “when you get a marriage li-
cense from a county clerk, that is a symbolic acknowl-
edgment that society accepts what you’re proposing to 
do. So I think it’s an important symbol of acceptance in 
society.” These quotes underscore the understanding 
that the right of marriage entails not only economic ben-
efits but also the social benefits of being recognized by 
others in your community as a legitimate, loving, com-
mitted couple. 
Like gays and lesbians (Hull, 2006), heterosexu-
als in “post-closet” institutional contexts such as UCC 
or UU congregations do still imagine rights as being 
about societal acceptance and as being important sites 
where people’s identities and lives are validated, de-
spite being part of congregations that recognize same-
sex marriages. However, their narratives reveal a ten-
sion between same-sex couples being able to announce 
their love and commitment and society recogniz-
ing that declaration. In other words, as the following 
quote from Charles illustrates, it is precisely because 
he understands rights to symbolize societal acceptance 
that he wavers about the importance of gays and les-
bians having the right to marry, even though he him-
self thinks they should. Talking about gay couples 
getting married, Charles says: “There’s a subtle dis-
tinction between being able to declare it and having 
the rest of society recognize it. To me, the right to de-
clare it without fear or persecution is a much more im-
portant thing than having society recognize it.” While 
Charles supports same-sex marriage, he also maintains 
a view that it would mean societal acceptance, some-
thing he is more hesitant to embrace as a goal worthy 
of achieving. 
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The narratives offered by Charles and other inter-
viewees highlight the following contradiction about 
the relationship between social and legal change. Ac-
cording to one understanding, social change should 
occur prior to any legal change: Same-sex couples 
should and will have the right to marry after the ma-
jority of people accept and support that right. How-
ever, at the same time, their narratives also reveal 
an understanding that legal change should and of-
ten does happen prior to change in societal attitudes: 
Same-sex couples should and will have the right to 
marry regardless (and before) of societal attitudes. 
Therefore, how do people justify this apparent contra-
diction in their understanding about same-sex mar-
riage? Below, I address how these reconciliations hap-
pen within the institutional and social context of their 
religious congregations. 
Reconciling Contradictions
Religious Values in Political Life and the Freedom to Decide
When asked about the role they thought religious be-
liefs or values should play in political life, interviewees 
stressed the importance of the separation of church and 
state and also expressed frustration about politicians 
trying to use religion to garner support. However, all 
but one person thought an individual’s religious beliefs 
or values should play a role in how they vote. In other 
words, respondents want religious and moral values 
part of people’s decisions in the political realm. Cindie 
explained that “all the decisions I make, I make know-
ing what my faith belief is, so I do think it’s very im-
portant.” Heather agreed that “I think if we stand for 
justice and if we stand for peace that has to carry into 
everything we do, whether it’s political or work related 
or how we spend our time or volunteering or spend-
ing money.” Jeff also articulated this belief that “voting 
consistent with ones’ religious beliefs, say, pro-choice 
or not, is legitimate.” Melissa also thinks that religious 
beliefs affecting political participation is inevitable and 
“in many ways a positive.” Andrea was the only person 
who thought individuals should not consider their reli-
gious beliefs when voting or making political decisions 
but should rather “transcend” them “in order to make 
sure society takes the course that is good for every-
body.” However, the majority of participants stressed 
the importance of individuals participating in political 
life in such a way that connects with their religious be-
liefs or values. 
In addition, interviewees stressed that individuals 
must have the freedom to decide their own truth and 
values, even if it fundamentally disagrees with their 
own position. This position is informed by both their re-
ligious beliefs and identity and their desire to distance 
themselves from religious conservatives. When talk-
ing about the importance of recognizing the diversity 
of opinions and granting others the freedom to decide 
what is true for them, the Unitarian Universalists inter-
viewees drew on the UU principle of “free and respon-
sible search for truth and meaning.” George explained 
that UUs “believe in individual freedom and in people 
making up their own minds.” United Church of Christ 
participants were more likely to reference their under-
standing of the Bible or Jesus when talking about the 
belief that everyone should have the freedom to make 
their own decisions and that there is no one truth. For 
instance, Cindie explained that: “my personal philoso-
phy is that no where in the Bible do I have instructions 
to judge anyone. What you do here on earth, you’re go-
ing to deal with God on later. It’s not my position to tell 
anybody they’re right or wrong on anything they do. 
It’s that—judge not lest ye be judged.” Although they 
drew on different sources to explain why, members of 
both religious groups were adamant that individuals 
should have the freedom to do and believe what they 
think is right. 
The hesitancy to offer an absolute judgment of oth-
er’s actions or beliefs was also informed by a desire 
to distance themselves from religious conservatives, 
who were often described as being a part of the “re-
ligious right.” The following example from Charles 
most clearly underscores this theme. He explained 
that he is “troubled” by the religious right because of 
“their claim to have the one and only right answer,” 
not because they are “a group of people with a particu-
lar point of view who are choosing to act collectively.” 
He further explained that “I don’t think that religious 
groups should be attempting to impose or proclaim-
ing that they have the corner on truth. So I would not 
advocate organizing Unitarians to say, no we have the 
right answer.” He thinks the claim to absolute truth is 
wrong, whether that be from the religious right or from 
Unitarian Universalists. While Charles thinks religious 
groups should be able to say “these are the ideals that 
we live by and we invite you to join our community 
and live by our values,” nothing further should occur 
if a person responds with “no thank you, I have my 
own values.” He says at that point, each side “should 
accept the right of the other to exist and have rights 
and opportunities in society.” Charles is committed to 
a world where people with differing opinions co-exist 
and do not impinge on each other’s rights and oppor-
tunities. He idealizes a fair society and a society with 
multiple truths and values. His quotes underscore the 
importance that interviewees place on both allowing 
an individual the freedom to decide her own values as 
well as on disavowing any claim to have an absolute 
truth. 
Since interviewees upheld individual freedom, they 
often not only acknowledged but also legitimated be-
liefs that fundamentally opposed their own. For in-
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stance, when talking about people who oppose same-
sex marriage and are uncomfortable with gay people, 
Melissa responded with the following: “Well, they be-
lieve it’s wrong. Just the same way I don’t want to have 
war, [gay marriage] is the equivalent to them. They sim-
ply believe that there’s a negative effect, the same way I 
think killing and fostering violence has a negative effect. 
I think they’re not necessarily hateful. I think their ex-
pression, to me is hateful, but I think they simply have a 
conviction that [gay marriage] is destructive, [the] same 
way I see war as destructive.” Melissa certainly does not 
agree with the belief that being gay is wrong nor that 
same-sex marriage will be destructive, but in this quote, 
she grants those beliefs the same legitimacy as her be-
lief that war is destructive. Similarly, Christine asserted 
that “there are some people who are totally uncomfort-
able with homosexuality. They cannot give a logical rea-
son, they just are uncomfortable and cannot be accept-
ing. And I don’t know what you do about that, nothing! 
You can’t legislate how somebody feels, and, it would 
be folly to try.” Christine’s quote suggests that it would 
be a folly (and ineffective) for legal changes to precede 
social changes with regard to attitudes toward homo-
sexuality and same-sex marriage. 
In this way, her quote, along with the others pre-
sented in this section, demonstrates how interviewees 
reconcile the contradictory understanding about same-
sex marriage within the context of their religious insti-
tutions. The majoritarian view of rights is strengthened 
by the belief that individuals should have the freedom 
to decide their own values and the ability to demon-
strate those values through voting. Discrediting the 
opinions of those who are anti-gay marriage would be 
akin to claiming only one truth, which religious pro-
gressives see as the problematic territory of religious 
conservatives. Therefore, while participants support the 
right for same-sex couples to marry, the meanings they 
make within their institutional religious context pro-
vide justifications for the understanding that rights do 
and should reflect the majority’s opinion. Thus, it would 
be unsatisfactory for same-sex marriage to become legal 
when the majority of people oppose same-sex marriage. 
Of course, it would also be unsatisfactory if same-sex 
marriage never became legal. Interviewees are optimis-
tic that change in opinions about same-sex marriage will 
happen through heterosexuals having more interactions 
with gays and lesbians, which will usher in a change in 
the legal realm. Again, the context of their religious in-
stitution, particularly its policy toward gays and lesbi-
ans, informs this optimism. 
Changing Opinions About Same-Sex Marriage
All but one participant understood that personal ex-
perience, meaning daily interactions as well as watch-
ing television with gay characters, is an important way 
that opinions about same-sex marriage would change. 
For instance, George explained that “subtle day-to-
day exchanges that people have” is mostly how per-
sonal beliefs about gay people and same-sex marriage 
shift. Positing how such a shift might occur, he said: 
“through encountering somebody and working with 
them…and they discover eight months later that he’s 
gay. [They think], well, I like him, he’s wonderful, so 
maybe being gay is not what I thought it was.” Like-
wise, Katie thinks that those opposed to homosexual-
ity “need to have relationships with people and grow to 
like them and then find out that they’re gay.” Thus, in-
terviewees believe that experiences with gays and les-
bians will lead to a progressive stance of being pro-gay 
and pro-same-sex marriage. They see their congrega-
tions as providing a space for such experiences to oc-
cur insofar as their congregations have a welcoming or 
open and affirming policy. 
Indeed, participants understood their welcoming or 
open and affirming policy to reflect a progressive stance 
on sexuality. Katie thinks “our church is certainly more 
open than a lot of churches about [sexuality].” Dan also 
assigns Unitarian Universalism not only a progressive 
quality but also the responsibility to bring about change. 
He says that UUs are supposed to “bring people out of 
the dark ages.” In talking about the UCC congregation’s 
history being involved in welcoming people regardless 
of race or sexuality, Lynette says “I feel good about the 
things that this congregation is doing and always has 
done.” However, their descriptions of what it means for 
heterosexuals to have experiences with gays and lesbi-
ans and of what their congregational policy means re-
veals an understanding that sexuality is an irrelevant, 
private, and unimportant characteristic. To notice or 
comment on one’s sexuality is bad, and linking sexual-
ity to sex is even worse. 
According to the majority of interviewees, their con-
gregation’s policy means that sexuality does not matter 
and is a secondary characteristic. Talking about some-
one’s sexuality, Bob explained that: “I don’t really care 
and it basically doesn’t make any difference to me. I 
don’t consciously give it any thought.” Lynette also de-
scribed how she is open and affirming toward gays and 
lesbians in her congregation in the following way: “I 
don’t view them differently, treat them differently, or 
respond to them in any different manner.” She goes on 
to give the example that “if somebody new has started 
coming and someone asks, ‘are they gay?’ I’ll say, ‘I 
don’t know, it doesn’t matter.’” In these quotes, not car-
ing about someone’s sexuality equates to perhaps not 
even thinking it is important to know about it. This in-
difference about one’s sexuality extends beyond the 
congregations as well. Rachel, for instance, asserted that 
“I have a lot of friends who are of a different orientation 
from me. I don’t look at them that way. They’re just my 
friends. I could care less who they go home with.” Like-
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wise, a story retold by Melissa underscores the under-
standing that to talk about someone’s sexuality, or even 
to give it any thought, is bad. When I asked if she had 
ever heard a group of middle schoolers to whom she 
had taught religious education say anything homopho-
bic, she shared the following story about hearing them 
talk about someone who won a local competition. She 
explained: 
They were telling me which one won and his 
sexuality came up. I remember somebody 
said ‘he’s gay’ and then somebody else said 
‘no he’s bi[sexual].’ And I didn’t say it, but I 
[thought] my God, this kid’s lost all privacy of 
his sexuality because he won this contest. So it 
was a very accepting, even though it was gos-
sip basically, there was a very accepting atti-
tude as well. But still, I found that interesting 
that it was a topic of conversation…I mean, 
who cares about his sexuality? I think he de-
serves to not have that be the thing that comes 
up when people are talking about his win-
ning. I just don’t think that anybody needs to 
have their sexuality as a topic of others’ con-
versation. Why make that a topic? Especially 
when you’re not judging it negatively. It was 
almost like a sensationalist thing. 
According to Melissa, even though the students were 
not saying anything negative about the winner’s sexu-
ality nor were making fun of him, but were rather men-
tioning it as one descriptor of who he was, she thinks 
they were out of bounds. For her, any discussion of 
someone’s sexuality is sensationalist because no one 
should care about it. 
The story retold by Melissa resonates with the how 
interviewees talked about the ideal way that attitudes 
towards same-sex marriage would change. People who 
are anti-same-sex marriage need to interact with gays 
and lesbians so they can realize that, as George put it, 
“being gay is not what I thought it was.” However, in 
the ideal interaction, sexuality remains unacknowl-
edged, so as to foster the ability for someone who is ho-
mophobic to like someone is who gay before knowing 
about their sexuality. Across all these stories, acknowl-
edging someone’s sexuality (too soon or in some cases, 
ever) in interpersonal interactions is negative, as sexu-
ality should be an irrelevant characteristic. Interview-
ees are optimistic that such experiences will lead to a 
more accepting stance on same-sex marriage. In fact, 
they reconcile the tension in how they think social and 
legal change should be related by relying on this opti-
mistic view that societal attitudes will change through 
interpersonal interactions. Not satisfied with the cur-
rent majority opinion with regard to same-sex mar-
riage, and also not interested in imposing their opinion 
on others, people justify this tension by pointing to a 
belief that the majority opinion will eventually change. 
They see the existence of their congregation’s policies 
toward gays and lesbians as one thing that might help 
facilitate such change. 
Discussion and Conclusion
Building on past research that has analyzed how gay 
and lesbians interpret the right of marriage (Harding, 
2006, 2008; Hull, 2006) and how religious communities 
have struggled with and responded to homosexuality 
(Cadge et al., 2007, 2008; Cadge and Wildeman, 2008; El-
lingon et al., 2001; Moon, 2004; Stein, 2001), this research 
asks how heterosexual in liberal religious congregations 
understand the right of marriage for same-sex couples. 
Given the small sample and recruitment techniques, 
these findings are not meant to be representative or gen-
eralizable. Rather, the strength of this method is in the 
fact that it provides an opportunity to highlight and an-
alyze the nuanced, contradictory narratives people have 
about law and social change. The data presented above 
underscore the competing way that rights are under-
stood: Rights for citizens are understood to be both a re-
flection and transcendence of the majority’s opinions. 
While respondents support same-sex marriage, they 
also support, perhaps more adamantly, an individual’s 
freedom to decide his or her own truth. Participants also 
want religious and moral values part of people’s deci-
sions in the political realm. These findings suggest that 
the tension between majoritarian and counter-majori-
tarian view of rights is only augmented given the im-
portance placed on an individual’s freedom to both de-
cide and act based on his or her own truth. Participants 
think that same-sex couples should have access to mar-
riage, yet their narratives reflect a hesitancy to claim to 
have an absolute truth or to force their values or beliefs 
on anyone else, whether those beliefs are about war or 
same-sex marriage. Doing so would mean participat-
ing in tactics they associate with religious conservatives 
and find unacceptable. While they view themselves as 
having a more progressive and enlightened stance on 
same-sex marriage, their understandings reflect a fine 
line between advocating for same-sex marriage and go-
ing too far in forcing other’s into agreement on the is-
sue. Rather, they hope that the majority opinions about 
same-sex marriage will change as more heterosexuals 
have personal experiences with gays and lesbians. 
It is important to address the timing of my study. 
All of these interviews were conducted in a state whose 
voters 6 months earlier had approved a ballot initiative 
that changed the state Constitution with the following 
amendment: “To secure and preserve the benefits of mar-
riage for our society and for future generations of chil-
dren, the union of one man and one woman in marriage 
shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or 
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similar union for any purpose.” This recent passage no 
doubt shaped the understandings that people articulated 
in the interview. As interviewees discussed their under-
standings about rights and the extent to which they are 
counter-majoritarian, they were doing so within a context 
where the majority of people had just approved a ban on 
the state recognizing the marriages of same-sex couples. 
Had I conducted the interviews at a different time, par-
ticipants might have addressed different court cases, for 
instance. However, their conflicted understanding about 
law and social change and the way they reconcile it pro-
vide some insights into how they might respond to the 
changes in the legal landscape that have since occurred 
since the time of the interviews. 
The findings presented in this article are instructive 
for thinking about the future of same-sex marriage in 
the USA and the role that religious progressive might 
play in advocating for it. By focusing attention on two 
denominations that support same-sex marriage, this ar-
ticle serves as a reminder that being religious need not 
be synonymous with being against same-sex marriage 
or gay rights. In fact, in her research on the Metropolitan 
Community Church, Howe (2007) argues that churches 
might be better situated to advocate for gay rights than 
other organizations that are seen as advocacy-orien-
tated. The religious progressives in this study want 
morals and religious beliefs to be a part of public policy 
discourse, including discussions about same-sex mar-
riage. Many of them also drew on ideas about morality 
they thought should transcend contemporary anti-gay 
attitudes in explaining their support for same-sex mar-
riage, thus signaling one potential avenue for bringing 
their “moral values” into public debates about same-
sex marriage. Future research could assess whether reli-
gious progressives assert similar explanations in public 
forums and how effective such assertions are vis-à-vis 
other religious people’s perspectives. 
This is not to suggest that the understandings of 
same-sex marriage among religious progressives, in-
cluding the ones presented in this article, are not with-
out problems. The findings presented here illustrate 
some of the potential issues that might arise for progres-
sive religious organizations advocating for same-sex 
marriage. One of the barriers is the desire for progres-
sive religious individuals to distance themselves from 
those they see as part of the religious right who claim 
absolute truth with regard to their stance on homosex-
uality and same-sex marriage. Fostering inter-faith dia-
logues might be one potential solution that would allow 
multiple religious perspectives on same-sex marriage to 
be heard. Having multiple perspectives might alleviate 
religious progressives’ fear of imposing their opinion on 
others without allowing for dialogue. 
Another potential limitation indicated by these find-
ings is the understandings of sexuality offered by in-
terviewees. While they support same-sex marriage and 
their congregation’s welcoming policy toward gays 
and lesbians, they also see sexuality as something that 
should be kept in the private realm. Not only should 
sexuality be in the private realm, but it should also be 
unrecognized even there, as it is an irrelevant character-
istic. By situating sexual identity as private, they con-
flate a public acknowledgement of gay or lesbian sex-
ual identity with being anti-gay. Rather than use a logic 
of pain when talking about gays and lesbians (Moon, 
2004), these liberal religious members use a logic that 
empties sexuality from having any meaning. Their nar-
ratives suggest a difference between heterosexuals 
and gays and lesbians that has implications for advo-
cacy efforts. While some gays and lesbians are increas-
ingly seeking public recognition of their relationships 
(and by extension, their sexuality) (Lewin, 1998; Hull, 
2006), some progressive heterosexuals maintain that 
sexuality should be not thought or talked about. Thus, 
the understanding that being progressive means treat-
ing sexuality as irrelevant or unacknowledged seems to 
be contrary to the recognition that some gays and les-
bians desire. Furthermore, the findings presented here 
also suggest a belief that the private sphere is seen as 
the proper site for sexual minorities to challenge pub-
lic legal status. Public demonstrations are seen as lead-
ing to backlash, too “in your face,” and not appropriate 
route given the emphasis on interpersonal interactions 
as the way to change attitudes. In this way, their nar-
ratives uphold a normative ideal of citizenship (Lister, 
1997; Richardson, 2004; Warner, 1999). 
I argue that such an understanding of sexuality un-
derscores the contradictory and incomplete inclusion 
of sexual minorities in the “post-closest” contemporary 
moment (Seidman, 2002). In other words, the under-
standing of sexuality offered by these religious progres-
sives is not necessarily unique to them. It does, how-
ever, have unique implications for thinking about how 
allies make sense of and advocate for same-sex mar-
riage. It indicates that when talking about the lives of 
gays and lesbians (their friends, members of their reli-
gious community), supporters of same-sex marriage of-
ten struggle to find a language to talk about how and 
why sexuality might matter in those lives. In other 
words, can there be a way to both express support for 
same-sex marriage and also recognize how sexuality 
might in fact be very meaningful for interpersonal in-
teractions and those individuals seeking rights? While 
Hull (2006) posits the possibility that engaging with the 
issue of same-sex marriage on moral terms and using 
personal stories to humanize the impact of the lack of 
recognition might help bolster supporters’ claims, these 
findings suggest that in addition to moral terms, there 
might need to be cultural terms that allow for a richer 
account of gay and lesbian identity and life. Moreover, 
this research illustrates a tension in post-closet world for 
heterosexuals as they negotiate how to both welcome 
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and accept gays and lesbians while simultaneously ac-
knowledge their sexuality. Accordingly, one implication 
of this research for progressive religious organizations 
is the need to continue dialogue about what a welcom-
ing or open and affirming policy might mean for same-
sex marriage advocacy. 
Furthermore, this research highlights a component 
that contributes to ambivalence about same-sex mar-
riage, even from people who support it. It shows that 
some heterosexual allies are ambivalent, though sup-
portive, because of a concern about legal changes hap-
pening prior to the majority of people accepting 
same-sex marriage. Just as past research has shown con-
tradictions among conservative Christians with regard to 
how they view same-sex sexual relations and gay rights 
(Linneman, 2004), or variation among religious individu-
als on specific gay right issues (Besen and Zicklin, 2007), 
this research shows contradictions among progressive 
religious people. While Hull (2001) found that support-
ers of same-sex marriage were likely to minimize the link 
between law and culture, the supporters in this study 
were very explicit about this link. In fact, it is precisely 
because of the tension in how rights are understood that 
creates ambivalence about same-sex couples having the 
right to marry prior to the majority of the public accept-
ing it. Even though the people I interviewed support 
same-sex marriage, they also maintain a view that rights 
are and should be granted by the majority. Listening to 
these narratives indicates the need to be mindful about 
the ambivalence when advocating for same-sex marriage 
and discussing chances that have occurred with regard 
to same-sex marriage. Future research could analyze the 
question of when a counter-majoritarian view of rights 
is most effectively supported. For instance, given that 
current public support is much higher than it was when 
these interviews were conducted (Langer, 2011) and that 
some states have made same-sex marriage legal through 
legislative action, do allies understand same-sex mar-
riage differently? 
Finally, a related implication of this research is that 
it indicates that this is a fraught moment when talking 
about law’s importance for sexual minorities—particu-
larly around marriage. How to talk about law’s impor-
tance in the daily everyday lives of sexual minorities 
presents a predicament. On the one hand, progressive 
religious allies see their congregations as places that ac-
cept gays and lesbians. This is important insofar as peo-
ple share similar views to Charles, who indicated that 
he was more concerned with gays and lesbians being 
able to declare their love, ostensibly something they are 
able to do via being able to have a commitment cere-
mony, than have it recognized by society, via being able 
to get a marriage license. As gays and lesbians continue 
to enact legality outside of the law (Hull, 2006) and het-
erosexual allies support this by similar actions (e.g., go-
ing to commitment ceremonies, using “wife” or “son 
in-law” regardless of the legal status of marriage), how 
might there be a simultaneous advocacy for the impor-
tance of the law? In a similar vein, since religious pro-
gressives articulate their support for marriage by draw-
ing on moral terms as well as by pointing to the material 
and social benefits of marriage, this research suggest 
that perhaps religious progressives might be less likely 
to recognize the psychological harm gays and lesbians 
experience as a result of not having access to marriage 
(Herdt and Kertzner, 2006). In other words, do reli-
gious progressives assume that any psychological harm 
is countered by having accepting spaces such as their 
congregations within which to celebrate their commit-
ment? Future work could address this question. More-
over, since this research highlights diversity of opinions 
among religious people and the contradictions in sur-
rounding ideas about the ideal relationship between the 
law and social changes, it indicates an important area 
that future work should continue to explore as the le-
gal changes with regard to same-sex marriage continue 
to proliferate. 
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